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The Domestic Legal Sources of Immigrant Rights:
The United States, Germany, and the European Union
That rights have legal sources seems to be a tautology, because in the modern
legal state there are no rights unless they are legally codified and implemented.
Regarding immigrants, however, the notion that rights have legal sources takes
on substantive meaning. For citizens, the nominal owners of their state, many
rights have social sources: they are grounded in conflict and the mobilization of
parties or social movements. Seen through the mirror of immigrants, one
suddenly realizes a fundamental presupposition of political sociology's epic
stories of the disenfranchised (be they workers, women, or blacks) struggling for
equal rights and inclusion: the formal citizenship of their protagonists. For
immigrants, there is no such linkage between social mobilization and rights,
because it presupposes legal membership in the polity. On the contrary, social
mobilization surrounding immigrants is more likely to be directed against
immigrants. The sources of immigrant rights lie elsewhere--not in the street or
the political assembly room, but behind the closed doors of courtroom and state
bureaucracy. The typical constellation of rights expansion for immigrants is not
the popular drama of social movements confronting the state or political
entrepreneurs competing for votes, but the quiet and largely unnoticed
processing of the legal system, which often conflicts with the restriction-
mindedness of popularly elected governments.
The extension of "citizenship rights for non-citizens" (Guiraudon 1998)
marks a significant change in liberal postwar states. Earlier in the century, long-
settled resident aliens in the United States could be deported or denied reentry
because of their race, national origin, sexual or political orientations, and certain
welfare benefits, the right to own land, and public sector jobs remained reserved
to citizens only (Neuman, 1996). Prussia-Germany subjected its recruited
seasonal migrant workers from Poland to a tightly supervised system of forced
4rotation, as part of a nationalist "Prussian defensive policy" (Preussische
Abwehrpolitik) against Poles that should prevent the permanent settlement of
this undesired population (see Bade, 1984:462-471). Such policies would be
difficult to conceive today. In the US, permanent resident aliens have come to
enjoy most of the rights that citizens enjoy (with the exception of political rights),
which has led a prominent legal observer to deplore the "devaluation of
American citizenship" (Schuck 1989). In (West) Germany, the Turkish
successors to the Polish migrant workers turned into the proverbial guests that
stayed, protected by one of the world's most protective systems of alien rights.
How can we explain this astonishing expansion of immigrant rights? A
prominent recent theory has argued that nation-states have become permeable
to global human rights norms and discourses, which protect people as universal
persons rather than as national citizens (Jacobson 1996; Soysal 1994). This
theory is undeniably attractive, because it helps explain the convergence of
similarly expansive schemes of immigrant rights across countries. But it gives an
incomplete, and in important regards misleading, account of the origins and
dynamics of immigrant rights in the countries considered here. First, the echo
from Singapoor and China to "universal" human rights is that these are really
"Western" human rights, which are deemed to have limited validity and
application elsewhere. In fact, forced rotation and denial of elementary
residence and family rights to labour migrants is disturbingly vital outside the
Western hemisphere (see Weiner, 1995:80-83). This suggests that global
human rights cannot be as "global" as proclaimed by the globalogists.
Secondly, even Germany, not now known to lie outside the West, is
currently experimenting with second-generation guestworker schemes, whose
legal provisions shall make sure that the recruited contract workers will not stay
this time round (Rudolph 1996). This suggests that even in a Western coreland
of human rights different legal regimes apply to different categories of migrants,
each endowed with rather different sets of rights. Those migrants who have
come to enjoy quasi-citizen rights are a rather limited and distinct group, who
are either set apart from the start as legal immigrants (USA), or who acquired a
similar status over time through the failure of the state to set clear time limits for
5work and stay at an early point (as was the case with Germany's guestworkers).
The reference to universal human rights, which indistinctly apply to all persons
and groups, cannot explain the internal differentiation of immigrant rights even in
those countries where these universal norms and discourses have originated.
Finally, globalogists have exaggerated the force of inter- or supranational
regimes for legitimizing and diffusing human rights norms. In turn, they have
underestimated, if not ignored throughout, the role of domestic legal orders and
legitimizing principles for immigrant rights. As John Herz (1957) rightly observed,
international law boils down to enshrining the principle of state sovereignty and
deducing some of the consequences. The entry of the individual into the
exclusive sphere of interstate relations, which occurred with the United Nations
conventions on universal human rights protection, has remained declaratory and
inconclusive (see L.Henkin 1990). The real constraints to state sovereignty are
to be found in the domestic legal orders, particularly in constitutional law, which
has been key to the development of immigrant rights.
In the following, I will compare the development of immigrant rights in the
United States, Germany, and the European Union. In each case, I will
differentiate between two sets of immigrant rights: alien rights proper and the
right to citizenship. Why these cases, why these rights? Regarding case
selection, the United States and Germany are the world's foremost immigrant-
receiving countries. While similar in their liberal stateness, both countries have
responded to postwar immigration in opposite ways: the United States has
endorsed immigration as compatible with its recovered national self-description
of "nation of immigrants"; (West) Germany has rejected immigration as
incompatible with its new-found self-description of "not a country of
immigration". These are extreme versions of the general coincidence of
immigration and nation-building in the transoceanic new settler nations, and of
the extraneousness of immigration to nation-building in Europe. If the United
States and Germany ended up with similarly expansive schemes of immigrant
rights, one must conclude that their opposite national self-descriptions cannot
be responsible for this. In fact, the opposite cases of the US and Germany show
that the weakening, if not absence, of nationalist semantics has been a
6prerequisite for expansive immigrant rights in liberal postwar states. Non-
nationalism, however, is not post-nationalism, because both states have
incorporated their immigrants on the basis not of global norms or regimes, but of
nationally distinct domestic legal orders.
Adding the European Union to this comparison seems odd. Unlike the
United States or Germany, the European Union is not a state. Moreover,
Germany is part of the European Union, and comparing the whole with one of its
parts may appear nonsensical. These reservations notwithstanding, the
comparison still makes sense. While its origins are functional, not territorial, the
European Union is increasingly evolving into a state-like entity with an own
currency, supremacy in expanding policy domains, and a membership as
"citizenship". The Amsterdam Treaty has supranationalized the immigration
function, and thus created the prospect of a "European" immigration policy. If
the Union is serious about its proclaimed human-rights identity, its immigrant
rights provisions will have be measured against the world's most advanced
immigrant rights regimes--such as that of the United States. At the same time,
the European Union is unlikely to evolve into a full-blown federal state, and
better conceived of as a multi-tiered polity whose constitutive units will remain
sovereign nation-states, not people. This implies that European immigrant rights
have to be measured and evaluated in the context of the immigrant rights
already instituted by the member states--such as Germany. Comparing the
European Union with other federal states, such as Germany and the United
States, has a long tradition.1 While the federal control of immigration and
immigrant policies is an increasingly contested issue, particularly in the United
States (see Spiro 1994; Schuck 1998), it will not be the main focus here.
Instead, the purpose is to point ou some peculiarities of the European Union's
treatment of immigrant rights in the light of some of the world's most elaborate
immigrant rights regimes.
The comparison will proceed along two ypes of immigrant rights, which
delineate two distinct trajectories of integrating immigrants: approximate
immigrant to citizen status, or enable immigrants to become citizens. The first
set of rights pertains to the residence, employment, and welfare interests of
7immigrants (subsequently labelled 'alien rights').2 The thrust of these rights is
universalistic, that is, to approximate immigrant to citizenship status, and to
remove discrimination on the basis of one's immigrant status. To the degree that
immigrants enjoy these rights, their immigrant-ness becomes irrelevant and
invisible. This has been the domain with the most dramatic rights expansion,
from which some political sociologists have concluded the rise of a
"postnational" alternative to citizenship. The second set of rights addresses the
transition to citizenship. This aspect of immigrant rights has been sidestepped
by "postnational" analysts (a notable exception is Bauboeck, 1994), because
upgraded alien rights are said to have rendered obsolete the acquisition of
citizenship. From such a perspective the recent pressure on exclusive
citizenship regimes (particularly in Germany) is incomprehensible. Regarding the
right to citizenship, which is counterbalanced by the solemn right of national self-
determination, there has been initially more variety between exclusive and
inclusive citizenship regimes. However, under the pressure of integrating later-
generation immigrants this variety is shrinking, as exclusive regimes are
undergoing a process of liberalization.3
Two questions will structure the following comparison. First, is there
convergence across states and policy domains in the development of immigrant
rights, or is there systematic variation? Second, is there a linear development of
immigrant rights, or are these rights reversible?
(I) The United States
1. Alien rights. "Aliens", according to the Immigration and Naturalization Act, are
"any person not a citizen or national of the United States." US immigration law
further distinguishes between immigrant or resident aliens, who are permitted to
permanent residence and expected to proceed to citizenship, and nonimmigrant
aliens, who--like students, tourists, diplomats, or temporary workers--are
admitted only for temporary periods and are expected to return to their countries
of origin. This distinction is crucial, because different regimes of alien rights
apply to both, with significant movements of rights expansion (and contraction)
8limited to the category of resident aliens. One also has to consider that the easy
access to citizenship in the US limits the practical relevance of more or less
developed resident alien rights.
The rights of resident aliens, which will be my focus here, are shaped by
two opposite legal-constitutional principles. One principle, which has been
labelled the "plenary power" principle, endows the political branches of the
federal government (presidency and Congress) with unconstrained, judicially
non-reviewable authority over the entry, stay, exclusion, and naturalization of
immigrant aliens--"Over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of
Congress more complete", the Supreme Court first declared in 1909, reaffirming
this view in numerous decisions late into this century (see Aleinikoff et al.,
1995). A second, opposite principle, which one could call the "personhood"
principle, puts resident aliens on a par with citizens as protected by a
Constitution whose key provisions turn around "personhood", and are thus
indifferent to formal citizenship status. Both the plenary power principle and the
personhood principle as applied to aliens cannot be found explicitly in the
Constitution; instead, they have been judicially constructed by courts and legal
scholars. The development of alien rights is thus largely one of case law, which
reflects changing views of the Constitution.
As opposite as they are, the plenary power and personhood principles
first appeared almost simultaneously, in the 1880s, the germinating period of
federal immigration law. "Plenary power" was infamously expounded in the
Chinese Exclusion Case of 1889, in which the Supreme Court upheld the
racially motivated exclusion of Chinese workers from the US, arguing that "(if
Congress) considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this
country...to be dangerous to its peace and security,...its determination is
conclusive upon the judiciary" (quoted in Schuck, 1984:14). "Personhood" as
applied to aliens appeared first in YickWo v. Hopkins (1886), in which the same
court argued that the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment was "not
confined to the protection of citizens", but "universal in (its) application...to all
persons within the territorial jurisdiction" (quoted in Bosn ak, 1994:1098). While
the two principles appeared almost simultaneously, plenary power prevailed
9over personhood well into the 1960s, when under the influence of the civil rights
revolution activist courts began to defend the rights of aliens more aggressively.
But this reversal has remained incomplete, and an unrepealed plenary power
principle has been the constitutional gateway to the massive federal restrictions
of the welfare rights of immigrants in the late 1990s.
Reflecting its origins in the late 19th century world of imperialism and
state nationalism, the plenary power doctrine depicts the alien as member of a
competing state unit, and the federal government as entrusted with the defense
of the national community against outside threats. In its expansive (yet judicially
contested) reading, plenary power covers not only the entry and departure of
the alien, but also her rights and obligations while on the territory of the United
States. To be sure, plenary power can cut both ways: the federal government is
free not to discriminate against resident aliens, for instance, in the provision of
federal welfare programs, as it mostly did until the most recent welfare backlash;
but it is also free to discriminate against aliens in the most blatant and capricious
ways, because immigration law remains the only domain in public law that is not
subject to judicial review. This has implied, until the Immigration Act of 1990
ruled them out statutorily, the exclusion and deportation of homosexuals
(labelled as "psychopathic personalities") and of political radicals (most often
communists). The only moderation of plenary power has occured regarding
deportation procedures, in which aliens (via the countervailing 'personhood'
principle) have come to enjoy constitutional 'due process' rights, and regarding
'exclusion' procedures against returning resident aliens, which are now
processed under the more lenient deportation rules.4 While the plenary power
principle has never been officially rescinded by the Supreme Court, its
legitimacy has been growing thin over time. Rec nt case law refrained from
defending it positively, pointing instead to the accumulated weight of past
practice (stare decisis), according to which, desirable as constitutional checks
on federal immigration power may be, "the slate is not clean" and plenary power
had become "firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body
politic" (quoted in Rubio-Marin, 1998:129).
Having been dormant for over eighty years, the "personhood" principle of
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alien rights reappeared with a vengeance in the early 1970s. In Graham v.
Richardson (1971), the Supreme Court invoked the equal protection clause of
the 14th amendment to strike down state statutes that withheld welfare benefits
from resident aliens. Seen from the vantage point of "personhood", resident
aliens were not in the first aliens, that is, members of competing state units, but
residents, that is, members of the societal community, who deserved equal
treatment. As the Court argued in Graham, "aliens, like citizens, pay taxes and
may be called into the armed forces...aliens may live within a state for many
years, work in the state and contribute to the economic growth of the state"
(quoted in Rubio-Marin, 1998:132). Furthermore, the court characterized aliens
as "discrete and insular minority", which the state was not allowed to
discriminate against. Following Graham, the Supreme Court and lower courts
struck down most existing state restrictions against resident aliens regarding
professional licenses, civil service employment, welfare programs, and
scholarships.
However, Graham's turning of alienage into a suspect classification that
states were not allowed to discriminate against was riddled with ambiguity.
Looking at aliens through the minority lense, the Court was evidently influenced
by the civil rights revolution of the time. Yet, if alienage classification was as
suspect as race classification, it should follow that aliens had to be allowed to
vote (to remedy their 'political powerlessness', which was offered in Graham as
justification of their suspect class status); that nonimmigrant aliens and illegal
aliens were even more than resident aliens an 'insular minority' entitled to
constitutional protection; and that aliens had to be every bit a minority for the
federal government as for state governments--which would derail plenary power.
Later case law attests to the unwillingness of the Supreme Court to consider
alienage such a "garden-variety suspect classification" (Rosberg, 1983:400).
First, in Sugarman v. Dougall (1973), the Court introduced the so-called "political
function exception", which reserved to citizens state jobs that were closely tied
to the "formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy" (quoted in Note
1979:1079). Invoking this doctrine, subsequent court decisions upheld state
statutes that made citizenship a condition for being a police officer, public school
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teacher, or a deputy probation officer. From the point of view of Graham, which
had made aliens a suspect class because of their political powerlessness, the
political function exception was paradoxical, because it releg imized the political
exclusion of aliens. Secondly, in De Canas v. Bica (1976) and Elkins v. Moreno
(1978) the Court affirmed that states could discriminate against illegal
immigrants and nonimmigrant aliens, respectively, in upholding a California
statute that outlawed the knowing employment of illegals (De Canas), and
allowing the state of Maryland to charge higher college fees from nonimmigrant
aliens (Elkins). Finally, in Mathews v. Diaz (1976), the Supreme Court reaffirmed
that the "personhood" protection at the state level was not available at the
federal level, where it was within the immigration (that is, 'plenary') power of the
federal government to exclude resident aliens from Medicare benefits if it so
wished.
An influential legal comment pointed out that in its Graham and post-
Graham decisions the Court had relied on an "unarticulated theory of
preemption" (Note 1979), which would obliterate the resort to the equal
protection standard of judicial review and do away with the ambiguity of
Graham's alienage as suspect classification theory. The federal preemption
alternative to equal protection rests on the constitution's supremacy clause,
which ensures the hierarchy of federal over state laws. This hierarchy is violated
whenever states take positions on aliens that deviate from those of the federal
government, and in which states arrogate to themselves immigration powers
that are the exclusive domain of the federal government. The federal
preemption standard was first applied in Takahashi v. Fish and Game
Commission (1948), where the Supreme Court argued that California cannot
deny fishing licenses to certain resident aliens, because the federal government
had admitted resident aliens "on an equality of legal privileges" that states were
not entitled to mess with. Preemption is consistent with Graham, because it had
struck down alien restrictions at the state level that had no parallel at the federal
level; and it was consistent with post-Graham, (some of) which simply applied
existing federal restrictions to the state level.
The debate on preemption or equal protection as adequate standard of
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review in alien cases is not merely academic, but has enormous practical
consequences. In fair weather, when the federal government decides to be
generous to aliens, preemption is an effective tool to prevent states from
discriminating against them. However, in tempestuous times, when the federal
government may switch to discrimination, preemption will force the states to do
the same. This is undeniably the situation today, after the exclusion of aliens
from most federal welfare programs, and it is an open question if the Supreme
Court will soon allow the states to do the same.
Plyler v. Doe (1982) was still decided on equal protection grounds. In this
most famous of all alien cases in the US, the Supreme Court invalidated a
Texas statute that withheld a free public school education from the children of
illegal immigrants. Protecting people the federal government wanted out by
definition, Plyler is the apogee of constitutionally sanctioned alien rights, "the
most powerful rejection to date of classical immigration law's notion of plenary
national sovereignty over our borders", as one author put it darkly (Schuck,
1984:58). The Court rejected to consider illegal aliens a "suspect class" a la
resident aliens in Graham, because it was dealing with people who had entered
without the consent of the government. Subjecting the state policy to the more
lenient legal test of "intermediate scrutiny", the Court still argued that the state
interest in saving money and deterring illegal immigrants did not outweigh the
withholding of a vital public function, education, from "innocent children" who
could not be held responsible for the law-breaking of their parents. Before
Plyler, illegal aliens had enjoyed formal due process rights under the
Constitution, which, for instance, protected them in deportation proceedings; the
novelty of Plyler was to extend to them substantive equal protection rights,
which entitled them to a share of the state bounty.
However, against the fears of conservative commentators at the time,
Plyler did not open up a new round of alien rights expansion. Rather, it was the
high point after which any further movement had to be retreat. After Plyler, the
fear of uncontrolled illegal immigration became a highly charged public issue,
which was eagerly picked up by political entrepreneurs, especially in
immigration-dense states such as California. Attacking alien rights, particularly
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to social services, was seen as relieving states of fiscal pressure and deterring
new immigration. In the dual context of plenary power and constitutionally
sanctioned equal protection rights for aliens, an attack on alien rights had to
occur in a two stage 'bottom-up top-down' movement: state pressure moving the
immigration issue to national level, with Congress passing restrictive alienag
legislation; and the Supreme Court taking Congress's restriction of alien rights
as justification for overturning Plyler, and retroactively validating restrictive state
laws on aliens. If there ever was such a 'strategy', it has paid off so far--with the
exception of a final Supreme Court verdict, which is still awaited.
The kick-off in the political crusade gainst alien rights was Proposition
187, California's highly successful state initiative of November 1994 that barred
illegal aliens from most state-provided services, including non-emergency health
care and school education. An open violation of Plyler and intrusion into the
federal immigration domain, Proposition 187 was immediately stalled in federal
courts. However, the most conservative Congress in half a century, which was
installed in the same November 1994 elections, proceeded quickly toward
similar legislation at national level. The Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation (Welfare Reform) Act of 1996 even broadens the
anti-illegal immigrant impulse of Proposition 187 into a generic exclusion of
aliens from virtually all federal cash assistance programs. At the same time,
most public welfare responsibilities are devolved to the states, and the latter are
either required or permitted to discriminate against aliens (legal and illegal) in
their welfare laws (see Schuck, 1998:218-221). The federal offensive threatens
to reverse the evolution of alien rights from Graham to Plyler, unless the
Supreme Court finds it in violation of the Constitution.5
(2) Transition to Citizenship. The structural compromising of alien rights by
plenary power, which has allowed the recent contraction of the welfare rights of
aliens, must be seen in the context of a historically inclusive citizenship regime,
which routinely absorbs aliens through lenient naturalization rules and hands out
automatic citizenship by birth on the territory (jus soli). Accordingly, if the federal
governments decides to get nasty toward aliens, it still leaves (most of) them the
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option to become citizens fairly easily (after five years of legal residence), and it
can never discriminate against second- or third-generation aliens in absence of
such a thing. The contraction of alien rights has promptly spurred a historically
unprecedented rush to citizenship, with new applications skyrocketing from an
already high level of 543,353 in 1994 to a staggering 1,400.000 in 1997
(Aleinikoff, 1998:16). The rush to citizenship has, in turn, raised concerns about
the "cheapening" of citizenship, as people are deemed to choose it for non-
affective, "instrumental" reasons (see Note 1997), and there has been pressure
for making citizenship more exclusive and more difficult to acquire. However, the
legal and political space for such manoeuvers is exceedingly small, because jus
soli citizenship enjoys constitutional status and there are few political incentives
to alter citizenship rules from which a large part of the electorate itself has
profited.6 If this is the case, the price paid for the attempt to upgrade citizenship
through downgrading alienship in the welfare reform act is the inevitable
downgrading of citizenship itself, whereby "lawful residence", not "citizenship", is
ironically reaffirmed as the dominant American membership model (Aleinikoff,
1998:50-54).
The dual pillars of the American citizenship regime are a constitutionally
guaranteed citizenship jure soli and statutory as-of-right naturalization (if minimal
residence and personal conditions are fulfilled). Both have been challenged in
recent years for their overinclusiveness, but without success. While functional to
the needs of an immigrant nation, jus soli citizenship in America is only
incidentally linked to immigration. Instead, the colonialists simply prolonged the
English feudal common law tradition, according to which those born in the king's
dominion were subjects of the king. Jus soli became constitutionally enshrined
in the Citizenship Clause of the 14th Amendment of 1868, which for the first
time established a national citizenship (and its priority over state citizenship) in
order to trump the racially exclusive citizenship schemes of some Southern
states and enfranchise the descendants of black slaves throughout the Union:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside." The racially neutral and inclusive character of jus soli citizenship
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survived even in times of government-sanctioned racial exclusivism. For
instance, in United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), the Supreme Court ruled
that children born to Chinese alien parents in the United States were U.S.
citizens, even though their parents were not eligible to citizenship according to
the racially exclusive naturalization laws of the time. Almost a century later, the
jus soli rule became attacked anew for indistinctly handing out the precious
good of citizenship to the US born children of illegal immigrant mothers, some of
whom allegedly crossed the border from Mexico only to give birth on US territory
and to derive rights from this accidental fact. Starting with the Governor of
California, Pete Wilson, a number of Republican Congressmen have repeatedly
suggested a Constitutional amendment that would exclude the US born children
of illegal immigrants from birthright citizenship.
The intellectual ground forthe attack on unqualified jus soli was laid by
two liberal East Coast scholars, who argued that ascriptive jus oli citizenship
had always been a "bastard concept" in the context of the American tradition of
consent-based political community (Schuck and Smith, 1985). More precisely,
Schuck and Smith interpreted the "jurisdiction requirement" of the Citizenship
Clause in a consensual, non-geographical sense, according to which the
framers of the 14th amendment had not intended to indistinctly include all
persons randomly present on the territory--such as the US born children of the
diplomatic corps of foreign nations or the self-governing Indian tribes, who were
originally excluded from citizenship under the 14th amendment. According to
this consensual reinterpretation of the Citizenship Clause, Congress was free to
exclude the children of illegal immigrants from birthright citizenship, even without
a constitutional amendment. And Congress should do so, in order to put
American citizenship "on a firm foundation of freely-willed membership" (ibid.,
p.140). Schuck and Smith's proposal was unorthodox thinking, because liberal
values were invoked to make citizenship less inclusive. How ver, as its
numerous critics pointed out, consensual reasoning had also underlied the
Supreme Court's infamous Dred Scott decision of 1857, according to which free
blacks born in the United States could not be "citizens" because the framers of
the Constitution had not considered them part of "the people of the United
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States" at the time of the nation's founding, and which to overturn had been the
whole point of the 14th amendment (Aleinikoff, 1998:8; Neuman, 1996:ch.9).
Among the flurry of restrictive citizenship and immigration proposals,
which circulated in the Republican-dominated Congress of the mid-1990s, the
one to narrow the jus soli rule never gained momentum. Considering that polls
found a near-majority of Americans in favour of it, this may come as a surprise
(Note, 1994:1026). However, as in all Western democracies, elite-crafted
citizenship and immigration policies are more liberal and inclusive than the
populist preferences of mass publics (see Freeman, 1995). Moreover, if ever
political culture has constrained policy-making, the idea of inclusive, equal
citizenship, for which the country had undergone a ferocious civil war in the mid-
19th century, and which has helped to integrate the two massive immigration
movements of the early and late 20th century, was too deeply entrenched to be
compromised for a short-term political purpose.
Since a constitutional amendment would not be reviewable by the
Supreme Court, its opponents could not rely on straightforward legal reasoning.
Instead, they had to show that it conflicted with the basic moral values that
undergirded the Constitution, and by implication, the American nation, which is
entirely a creature of the Constitution. This strategy is self-consciously pursued
in an influential note published in the Harvard Law Review, which argued that
the proposed citizenship amendment violated the principle of "equality before
the law", and thus "one of the foundations upon which American society is built"
(Note, 1994:1028): "If the government chooses to grant citizenship based on
situs of birth, to deny citizenship to a child born in the United States, when the
only factor that distinguishes her from the next child in the maternity ward is that
her mother entered the country unlawfully, would offend the principle of equality"
(ibid., 1028). In addition to this moral objection, the opponents of amending the
citizenship clause effectively raised a pragmatic objection: the denial of birthright
citizenship would create a European-style "hereditary caste of exploitable
denizens" (Neuman, 1996:166). The reference to Europe, especially Germany's
creation of a "permanent class of the disadvantaged",7 was a firm presence in
the Congressional hearings over the proposed amendment, and a reform that
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would make America more European could certainly not stir Congressional
enthusiasm.
In contrast to the constitutionally anchored jus soli rule, the acquisition of
citizenship through naturalization is ruled by simple statute, and it even counts
as a prime function of the federal government's "plenary" immigration powers.
Accordingly, in contrast to jus soli citizenship, which was not dictated by
immigration concerns, the American naturalization laws had always been
centrally influenced by immigration concerns. The generally low threshold to
naturalization reflects the needs of a country peopled by immigrants, who are
set on a trajectory to citizenship from the start. At the same time, the mantle of
plenary power allowed US naturalization law to be tainted by racial exclusivism
over long periods. The first federal naturalization law in the late 18th century
stipulated that only "free white persons" could naturalize, a condition that was
relaxed for blacks after the Civil War and for Asians after World War II, until the
McCarran/Walter (Immigration and Nationality Act) of 1952 finally established
racially neutral naturalization rules (N uman, 1998:8). Under the current rules,
naturalization is a statutory right after five years of legal permanent residence,
'good moral character' displayed throughout this period, the passing of English
language and civic knowledge tests (which may be waived under certain
conditions), and an oath expressing allegiance to the United States and
renouncing all prior allegiances.
In response to the recent rush to citizenship and external political
changes, the renunciation oath has become the subject of debate. In principle,
the need to renounce allegiance to any "foreign prince, potentate, state, or
sovereignty" (as is the awkward wording even today) means the rejection of
double citizenship. In reality, however, the US has always tolerated double
citizenship, also because it was forced to do so from early on, when the feudal-
absolutist regimes of Europe kept their emigrating subjects in perpetual
allegiance and did not recognize their adoption of US citizenship.8 Over long
periods, the toleration of double citizenship was facilitated by extremely tight
laws on the loss of citizenship. Well into the second half of the 20th century, US
citizens--naturalized and native-born--could lose their citizenship for naturalizing
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in a foreign state, marrying a foreigner, or voting in a foreign election. Only in
1967, in its Afroyim v. Rusk decision, which overruled the plaintiff's expatriation
for having voted in the Israeli elections, did the Supreme Court establish that
Congress has no power to "rob a citizen of his citizenship", unless he or she
"voluntarily relinquishe(s)" US citizenship (Spiro, 1997:1451).
Ever since the government has lost its expatriation powers, dual
citizenship appears in a less sanguine light. But only an external event catalyzed
a reconsideration of double citizenship. In 1998, Mexico introduced a
constitutional amendment that allows its emigrants to keep their Mexican
'nationality' even after naturalizing abroad.9 This reflects a general trend in
immigrant-sending countries to relax their citizenship laws in the interest of
retaining ties with their diasporas abroad.10 In addition, Mexico's move is a direct
response to California's Proposition 187, which it had fiercely critized, and after
which the Mexican government took on the role of protector of its sizeable
population north of the border. Mexico's citizenship reform, which is bound to
create a large number of US-Mexican dual citizens in the near future, has given
new urgency to the old suspicion that Mexican immigrants are not assimilating
like the other immigrant groups, and that they are not sufficiently loyal to their
new country even after acquiring US citizenship. More concretely, the Mexican
reform has stirred calls to give teeth to the naturalization oath, whose
renunciation component had so far never been enforced. However, even louder
than the calls to tighten the oath are those to abolish it altogether for
"postnational" reasons (e.g. Spiro 1997). Chances are that the moderate center
will prevail, which proposes--like the 1990s Federal Commission for Immigration
Reform--to "modernize" the wording of the renunciation oath, or--in recognition
of postnational sensibilities--to moderate the "exclusive" loyalty requirement to a
"primary" loyalty requirement (Aleinikoff, 1998:38f). That the advocates of
exclusive citizenship have recently zeroed in on the naturalization oath, whose
role in the larger citizenship scheme is rather marginal, testifies to the resilience
of inclusive citizenship in the United States.
(II) Germany
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1. Alien Rights. The German Alien Law defines as "alien" (Auslaender)
"everyone who is not German according to Article 116(1) of the Basic Law." This
points to a phenomenon unknown in the United States and most other Western
countries, ethnic priority immigration. Article 116(1) defines as Germans not only
the nominal holders of German citizenship, but--in combination with the Federal
Expellee Law (Bundesvertriebenengesetz)--the descendants of German settlers
in Eastern Europe and Russia, who are German not by citizenship but by
ethnicity. On the assumption of being subject to persecution and discrimination
by the former Communist regimes of the region, the ethnic Germans were the
only foreign nationals which postwar Germany accepted as "immigrants", that is,
as entrants set on a path for permanent settlement and citizenship. At the same
time, these de facto immigrants, who in the 1990s were even subjected to
numerical quotas and formal application procedures similar to those in classic
immigration countries, were never officially considered as "immigrants"--rather,
they were treated as "resettlers" (Aussiedler) who acted on their constitutional
right to return to their country of origin.11
The rejection of the "immigration" label applied also, now even explicitly,
to the other source of de facto immigration after World War II: the recruited
labour migrants (Gastarbeiter) from Southern Europe. In response to this labour
migration, the (West) German political elite even waged one of its few attempts
at national self-description, to be "not a country of immigration". This notoriously
misunderstood term, which "articulates not a social or demographic fact but a
political-cultural norm" (Brubaker, 1992:174), still stands for the self-abdication
of the political process to steer the incorporation of labour migrants. At the
political level, the result was drift, a shying away from forcibly rotating labour
migrants once they were no longer needed, but also refusing to accept the
consequence of non-rotation: permanent settlement. The self-abdication of the
political process is expressed in the fact that an austere and rudimentary Alien
Law passed in 1965, which grants no rights whatsoever to the labour migrant
and puts her at the mercy of a benign state, went unreformed for twenty-five
years. If in this period the labour migrants achieved a secure permanent
20
resident status, akin to the legal immigrant status in the United States, we have
to look to the legal process for an explanation.
Like in the United States, aliens in Germany enjoy extensive
constitutional rights. In the absence of the political process giving clear signals
toward either terminating or consolidating the presence of labour migrants in
Germany, an aggressive Federal Constitutional Court stepped in to secure the
residence and family rights of labour migrants, thus in effect crossing out the
"not a country of immigration" label of the political elite. Two differences to the
US case stand out. First, the German co stitutionalization of alien rights started
from a lower level--aliens admitted only for temporary work, not permanent
settlement--and it moved toward creating a "resident alien" status whose
existence could be taken for granted and was the starting-point for further rights
expansion in the US. Secondly, there is no parallel in German constitutional law
to the "plenary power" principle, which exempted the federal immigration powers
in the US from constitutional constraints. In a conscious departure from the legal
positivism of the Weimar constitution, and from the German state tradition more
generally, the Basic Law establishes the ontological primacy of the individual
over the state in all policy domains (see Kommers, 1997:41). This is expressed
in the opening article of the Basic Law: "The dignity of the human being is
untouchable. Its recognition and protection is the obligation of all statal power."
The absence of a plenary power principle has allowed the Constitutional Court
not just to enter the immigration domain, which remained largely closed to the
US Supreme Court, but to actively work against and stall the state's (no-
)immigration policy.
In contrast to the US constitution, the German Basic Law distinguishes
more explicitly between universal human rights (Jedermannrechte) and rights
reserved to Germans (Deutschenrechte). Among the Deutschenrechte are the
right to free assembly and forming associations, free movement (Freizuegigkeit),
and choice of profession (Berufsfreiheit)--the last two being crucial for a secure
residence status. However, the Constitutional Court has established in its case
law that, over time, aliens are due even the Deutschenrechte. The key to this is
Article 2(1) of the Basic Law, which guarantees the "free development of
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personality". The Court has expansively interpreted this article as a "residuary"
fundamental right (Auffanggrundrecht), which guarantees long-settled aliens
access to the Deutschenrechte. Interestingly, whereas in the US the
constitutional incorporation of aliens occurred in the name of "equality", in
Germany it occurred in the name of "freedom".
If the general freedom clause of the Basic Law is the "how" of
constitutional protection for aliens, the question remains  "when" it applies. If it
applied indistinctly to all aliens who happen to put their feet on German territory,
the German state would be a small world state, which it obviously is not. Here
the Court, in line with constitutional scholarship, has argued that with the alien's
increasing length of stay in the territory the degree of constitutional protection
increases. The underlying idea, formulated by Gunther Schwerdtfeger (1980) as
Rechtsschicksal der Unentrinnbarkeit (legal fate of inescapability), is that with
the alien's increasing stay in Germany the return option becomes ever more
fictional, so that she has to rely on the German state for existential protection.
The Constitutional Court most succinctly applied this logic in its so-called Indian
Case decision of 1978, which concerned the renewal of residence permits.12
According to the Alien Law, residence permits were valid for only one year, after
which the alien could ask for a renewal. Crucially, there was no legal difference
between a first and a renewed permit, a renewal could be denied as if it were a
first-time application. In practice, with each renewal the legal situation of the
alien did not even not improve; it even worsened, because his continued
residence could be seen by the residence-permit granting Land authority as
contradicting the official "no immigration" policy of the federal government after
the recruitment stop of 1973. In the Indian Case, the Constitutional Court
reversed this logic, arguing that the routine renewal of residence permits in the
past created a "reliance interest" on part of the alien in continued residence,
according to the constitutional principle of V rtrauensschutz (protection of
legitimate expectations), which the Court derived from Article 19 of the Basic
Law (the so-called Rechtsstaatsprinzip). The Court famously added that this
individual reliance interest outweighed the state's interest in implementing its no-
immigration policy.
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The Constitutional Court's Indian Case decision reveals two distinct
features of constitutional alien rights in Germany. First, constitutional protection
is incremental, it increases with the length of residence, until a threshold is
reached that makes even the D utschenrechte available to the alien. This
differs from the logic of alien rights in the US, which started with constitutional
equality as a general rule (at least at the subfederal level), and required special
justification if differential treatment was introduced (see Rubio-Marin, 1998:185).
Secondly, this incrementalism is conditional upon a lack of resolve on part of the
state. Temporary guestworkers did not turn into permanent settlers because of
the automatism of constitutional law; rather, constitutional law was activated
only because the state had failed to be explicit about limits and deadlines.
Accordingly, the Court argued in the Indian Case: "If the residence permit had
been issued...with a clear indication of its...non-renewability, the plaintiff could
not have relied on a renewal and derived claims from his integration (in German
society)."13 In other words, Germany's guestworker immigration was a historical
accident; it could have been avoided if the state had shown more determination
to stop it at an early stage.
This is why, in the early 1990s, Germany could embark on a second
round of guestworker recruitment, this time with the countries of East-Central
Europe (see Rudolph, 1996, 1998). These programs, which in 1996 accounted
for ten percent of the 2.14 million legally employed foreigners in Germany, have
a variety of motivations, such as resolving temporary labour shortages in certain
sectors (agriculture, hotels and restaurants, and the construction industry),
legalizing existing illegal employment patterns, and reducing migration pressure
at the vulnerable eastern EU border. This time around, the individual work and
residence permits, which are framed by bilateral agreements with the sending
states, stipulate maximum periods that cannot be extended, with the threat of
forced rotations; they preclude the possibility of family reunification; and they do
not allow the 'upgrading' of the worker's legal status over time. To implement
these provisions, the German state authorities have introduced a tight internal
control system with frequent checks on worksites and substantial employer fines
in case of violations of work contract conditions and illegal employment. If the
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state maintains its resolve, there will be no Basic Law to the rescue of the new
labour migrants from East-Central Europe.
Germany's two guestworker programs, both of which were processed
under rather different legal regimes, should caution us against blanket
statements about "alien rights", without specifying the distinct category or group
of aliens in question. Matters are further complicated by the existence of
"privileged" categories of foreigners, such as nationals of member states of the
European Union, who are exempted from the Foreigner Law altogether and
enjoy equal work and residence rights according to European Community law.
Accordingly, guestworkers from Italy, Spain, or Greece never had to rely on
constitutional law; they were already protected by EC law. The alien groups
around which the system of constitutional rights protection has been built are all
from non-EU states, most importantly Turkey and the former Yugoslavia, who
together provided over half of the classic guestworkers in Germany.
Constitutional law has helped them to avoid deportation, stabilize their
residence, and reunify with their families,14 and ultimately to enjoy equal civil and
social rights.
Equally important, however, has been the development withi  the
political elite of a moral compact with the guestworkers, who had been brought
into the country and now could not be disposed of at will. The new Foreigner
Law of 1990, which put into the form of statutory law the positions hammered
out by Constitutional Court decisions before, also contains some extra-
concessions that transcend the constitutional mi umum--such as waiving a one-
year waiting time for marriage immigration or granting the right of (re)return to
second-generation guestworkers who had temporarily decided to return to their
country of citizenship. This was perhaps part of a moral calculation, according to
which being generous to the old guestworkers was the best way of being
decidedly less generous to the new.
2. Transition to Citizenship. The expansion of alien rights in Germany occurred
in the context of a historically exclusive citizenship regime, which is based on
statutory citizenship by descent (jus sanguinis) and discretionary naturalization.
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This was no sheer coincidence: expansive alien rights allowed to justify the
long-term exclusion of foreigners from the citizenry. Accordingly, the
Naturalization Rules of 1977 stated that the "personal interests" of the applicant
could never be decisive, "also because resident foreigners already enjoy far-
reaching rights and liberties according to the German legal order" (quoted in
Hailbronner and Renner, 1991:626). But why keep foreigners out of the
citizenry? The simple answer is (West) Germany's unity mandate. West
Germany understood itself as a provisional state, which was to work toward
"completing the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination", as
the old Preamble of the Basic Law put it. An expression of this mandate was the
legal fiction that the pre-war German Reich continued to exist, and with it an all-
German citizenship according to the Wilhelminian Reichs- und
Staatsangehoerigkeitsgesetz of 1913. Accordingly, the West German citizenship
regime was exclusive toward foreigners, but inclusive toward the citizens of the
GDR and the ethnic Germans in the other countries of the Soviet Empire.15
There is certainly no l gical connection between excluding foreigners and
including East Germans and ethnic Germans. However, it was the empirical
connection made by the political elites of pre-unity Germany, for whom meddling
with citizenship law meant meddling with the legal bridge to national unity.
Contrary to some conservative legal scholars (e.g. Uhlitz 1986), the
Basic Law nevertheless does not prescribe a nationalistic citizenship, but leaves
the definition of citizenship to the political process. This is evident in Article
116.1 of the Basic Law, which defines as Germans the holders of German
citizenship, and does not further specify how citizenship is to be determined. But
the same article includes in its definition of Germans the expellees and refugees
of German origins residing in the German Reich according to the borders of
1937, and their descendants. From the addendum 'and their descendants' some
legal scholars have concluded that the Basic Law, at least indirectly, prescribes
exclusive jus anguinis citizenship (e.g., Ziemske, 1994:229). Considering that
Article 116.1 was conceived of as only temporary device to cope with the
consequences of the war, this has never been the dominant constitutional
opinion. More widespread has been the view that the Basic Law's general
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conception of the Federal Republic as a provisional, incomplete nation-state
commanded its closure toward foreigners, because the inclusion of the latter
might undermine the social impulse for unification through changing the texture
of the citizenry: "Conceiving of the Federal Republic as a country of immigration
with multiple national minorities would contradict the Basic Law's conception of a
provisional state geared toward the recovery of national unity" (Hailbronner,
1983:2113).
Constitutionally prescribed or not, there has been a factual linkage
between exclusive citizenship and the unresolved national question. Proof to
this is that precisely since reunification there has been a steady trend toward
more inclusive citizenship. Once citizenship was divested from the national
question, it could be seen as a tool of immigrant integration. Here Germany only
followed a general trend across Western European countries, which have eased
the access to citizenship in recent years in order to better integrate second- and
third-generation immigrants (see Hansen, 1998). The first step in this direction
was the new Foreigner Law of 1990, which turned naturalization from the
exception into the rule, lowered its costs significantly, and granted exceptions to
the previously strict prohibition of double citizenship. A second step occurred
with the Asylum Compromise of 1992, which turned "as a general rule" into "as
of right" naturalization. This removed the two pillars of the old Naturalization
Rules: absolute state discretion and cultural assimilation as precondition for
citizenship. As a result of these changes, naturalization is now routinely
available for long-settled foreigners. This shows in a dramatic increase of
naturalization rates, the number of naturalizing Turks, for instance, increasing
from about 2,000 in 1990 to more then 31,500 in 1995 (Freeman and
Oegelman, 1998:776). Moreover, dual citizenship, though still shunned in official
political discourse, is widely tolerated in administrative practice. About half of the
discretionary naturalizations in 1993 entailed dual citizenship with the full
knowledge of German state authorities. If one adds the effect of a new law in
Turkey that allows its expatriated citizens to reaquire Turkish citizenship
instantly, it is safe to assume that the vast majority of discretionary
naturalizations in Germany today imply double citizenship (Koslowski,
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1998:744). As a result of little noticed legislative and administrative changes (the
latter particularly in 'progressive' states with a high concentration of
foreigners)16, the exclusive citizenship regime of the pre-unity period is no
longer.
However, as Rogers Brubaker (1992) has rightly seen, the politics of
citizenship is identity politics, in which pragmatic considerations are often
subordinate to deeply held views about the collective self, the nation. In the
United States, this helped preserve a historically inclusive citizenship regime
despite massive pressures for more exclusive citizenship. In Germany, there is
the opposite constellation of identity considerations working against more
inclusive citizenship. From Germany's ethnocultural tradition of nationhood
stems a special distrust of "divided loyalties" that would result from handing out
citizenship more easily. A leading opponent of citizenship reform in the CDU
articulates the traditional view: "Granting citizenship cannot be an instrument of
integrating foreign residents. Instead, naturalization requires that the integration
of the respective foreigner has already occurred. A foreigner who wants to
acquire German citizenship must commit himself to our national community.
Tolerating double citizenship would lead to the formation of permanent national
minorities."17 Ethnocultural concerns were readily available to block any
furthergoing, political reform of citizenship law.
Despite the partial opening of citizenship through relaxed naturalization
rules, by October 1998 there still were 7,3 million foreigners in Germany. Two-
thirds of them had resided in the country for more than ten years, and thus were
likely to stay; twenty percent were even born in Germany; and 100,000 new
"foreign" births occurred each year (which is thirteen percent of all births).18
Further aggravated by a xenophobic groundswell since the early 1990s and
alarming signs of social despair and failed integration among young "foreigners"
(see Heitmeyer et al., 1997), here was a clear problem that called for a solution.
Because the space for administrative liberalization and small-step legislation
had been exhausted by then, a furthergoing solution had to be political, and
consist of a major overhaul of the outdated Wilhelminian citizenship law that
locked out second- and third-generation immigrants through its jus sanguinis
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provisions. This meant that the administrative and incremental mode of
citizenship reform, which had dominated so far, had to give way to "big leap"
legislation, which inevitably goes along with politicization and public scrutiny. A
nominal majority in parliament for such legislation nevertheless existed already
under the old conservative-liberal government; it was tried by repeated
opposition bills, but could not be realized because of resistance from the
Bavarian CSU and nationalistic sections in the CDU.
After the shattering defeat of the CDU/CSU in September 1998, this
obstacle seemed gone. The new government of SPD and Greens promptly
announced a new citizenship law. Hammered out as part of the coalition
agreement, the reform proposal called for automatic jus soli citizenship if at least
one parent was born in Germany or had lived there since the age of fourteen,
and it would lower the residence minimum for as-of-right naturalization from
fifteen to eight years.19 Crucially, double citizenship was to be officially
accepted. As the government stressed, this was no philosophical acceptance of
double citizenship, but its pragmatic acceptance for the sake of immigrant
integration. While a complete rupture with Germany's ethnocultural citizenship
and nationhood tradition, the envisaged reform was in line with the practice of
Germany's European eighbours, such as Belgium, France, the United
Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain, all of which tolerated double
citizenship and had similar jus soliprovisions (see Renner, 1993:23f). Moreover,
the reform would only put into law what had already been domestic
administrative practice, in which double citizenship was widely tolerated, not
only regarding an increasing share of naturalizing foreigners, but regarding all
naturalizing ethnic Germans and regarding children born either to binational
parents in Germany or to German parents in jus soli countries. When double
citizenship became depicted as a threat to the nation-state, there already were 2
million dual citizens in Germany. Double citizenship was even partially
sanctioned by the Constitutional Court, which ruled in 1974 that the interest of
the state in reducing multiple nationality was not strong enough to deny a child
the nationalities of both of its parents.20
Despite the widespread de facto (and partial de jure) toleration of double
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citizenship, the CDU/CSU opposition parties decided to object to its official
acceptance through a major societal campaign. This broke an unwritten
consensus among the political elites not only in Germany, but in all Western
states, not to subject immigration-related issues to populist exploitation.21 Since
their votes in parliament were not enough to block the reform, the people had to
be mobilized. Urged by the Bavarian CSU, whose chairman Edmund Stoiber
deemed the reform "more dangerous" to Germany's domestic security than the
terrorism of the Red Army Faction (RAF) in the 70s and 80s, the CDU agreed to
mute its own liberal instincts and collect signatures against the "double
passport" (Doppelpass, as the Red-Green reform proposal became lab lled in
public discourse). While admired in football, the Doppelpass22 was decidedly
less popular in politics. A poll in early January 1999 found 52 percent of
respondents against it, and the surprising defeat of SPD and Greens in the state
elections in Hesse in February 1999, which had been fought by the CDU on the
citizenship issue, must be attributed to the mighty societal groundswell against
double citizenship that was unleashed by the signature campaign. Within a
month, one million signatures had been collected, half of them in the election
state of Hesse (which amounts to one-twelth of the state population).23 To avoid
embarrassing fraternizing with the extremist right, one of whose leaders
welcomed the signature campaign as "something taken from the pages of our
newspaper, the Nationale Zeitung",24 the CDU framed its campaign as one for
"integration and tolerance".25 This was at least a symbolic concession to the old
liberal elite consensus on immigration, which the campaign itself had helped to
destroy.
The anti-Doppelpass campaign demonstrates that societal mobilization
surrounding immigrants is likely to be to their disadvantage. The first bill
presented by the Interior Ministry in January 1999 stuck to the double citizenship
toleration of the coalition agreement, but it already carried the signature of the
incipient signature drive: naturalization was to be contingent upon a written
declaration of the applicant that he or she was loyal to the Constitution, tested
German language competence, no welfare dependency or unemployment, and
the (near-)absence of a crime record.26 This was remarkably tougher than the
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naturalization conditions then in place--with the exception of a lower residence
requirement and the toleration of double citizenship. Double citizenship became
intolerable after the defeat of SPD and Greens in the Hess  elections, which
removed their majority in the upper house of parliament, the Bundesrat. Now
any reform of citizenship law had to be agreeable to the Liberal Party (FDP), in
order to pass the Bundesrat hurdle. The FDP had long been a champion of
citizenship reform, but it was less sanguine about double citizenship than the
Greens, which had sofar dictated the government approach. Its 'option model'
(Optionsmodell) suggested a provisional jus soli citizenship for second-
generation immigrants until the age of 23, by which the immigrant had to choose
between abandoning the foreign citizenship or losing the German citizenship.
Moreover, double citizenship would not be available to naturalizing immigrants.
This is the position eventually embraced by the government, and likely to
become law in 1999.
The Optionsmodell formally sticks to the old principle of avoiding double
citizenship, but it will factually increase the number of dual citizens in Germany.
Since dual citizenship is inherently difficult to control, the reform is likely to be
but a step in a furthergoing acceptance of dual citizenship in Germany. And
once the smoke of campaigning has cleared, the rupture with Germany's
ethnocultural citizenship tradition will stand out, as jus soli citizenship (which in a
world of plural citizenship regimes always entails multiple citizenship) will have
become the norm. Germany's citizenship reform shows that in liberal states
there is convergence on inclusive citizenship, but that it is likely to happen
despite of rather than because of societal mobilization. Most importantly, it
shows that the combination of extensive alien rights and exclusive citizenship,
which had characterized pre-unity (West) Germany, cannot be stable, because it
skirts a fundamental dimension of immigrant integration: full membership in the
nation-state.
(III) The European Union
1. Alien Rights. The European Union (EU) is not a state, but a treaty-based,
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functional regime established by a number of European states to create and
supervise a common economic market, that is, "an area without internal frontiers
in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is
ensured."27 However, adding human beings to the list of free-movement entities
helped unleash a dynamics that brought the EU to the brink of state-building,
which is acknowledged in the Maastricht Treaty's creation of a EU
"citizenship".28 Human beings were originally conceived of as functionally
specific factors of production ("workers", according to Article 48 of the European
Community Treaty), but through having bodies, souls, and social needs
attached to them they eventually matured into functionally diffuse "citizens",
which in common understanding are state-constituting units. The spill-over from
worker to citizen repeats at supranational level a dialectic that Karl Polanyi
(1944) had identified in the national development of welfare capitalism.
However, not class struggle, but a legal dynamics is responsible for this
outcome. This dynamic consists of the transmutation of the European
Community from treaty-based international organization into law-making
sovereign in specified domains. A key element in this transmutation is the
"Constitutionalization" of the European Community Treaty, which refers to the
process in which the European Court of Justice (created as the guardian of
European Community law) came to interpret the European Community Treaty as
if it were the constitution of a federal state, conferring rights on individuals and
trumping the national laws of the member states (see Weil r, 1991). This was a
process fiercely resisted by the member states, and regarding the work- and
settlement-oriented movement of people across borders (that is, "immigration") it
showed a conflict constellation similar to the one in nation-states: courts
defending the rights of immigrants, against the restrictionist leanings of
governments.
However, there is one crucial difference between the legal empowerment
of immigrants in Europe and in nation-states: the formal constitutions of nation-
states guarantee elementary human rights irrespective of citizenship, which
courts could use to protect (settled) aliens. In contrast, the informal constitution
of Europe applies only to nationals of the member states, over whose definition
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Europe also has no competence. The legal empowerment of immigrants in
Europe is thus limited to exogenously defined "privileged" immigrants who are
citizens of one of the member states of the European Union. In the earlier
literature these privileged crossborder movers were referred to as "migrant
workers", which one author characterized as "a legal status somewhere
between immigrant or citizen" (Garth, 1986:89). The notion of migrant worker
has in the meantime disappeared, which attests to the successful integration of
internal crossborder movers into the fabric of Europe.
States may have created the European Community to further their
economic and political interests; but their creation, like the fabled sorcerer's
apprentice, in turn took on a life of its own that conflicted with the interests of its
creators. In few domains is the clash between state interests and emergent
supranational interests as visible as in that of free movement of workers, and in
few domains has the victory of supranational over state interests been more
marked. Hero in this play has been the European Court of Justice (ECJ), about
which one of its former members remarked: "If it can be said to be a good thing
that our Europe is not merely a Europe of commercial interests, it is the judges
who must take much of the credit" (Mancini, 1992:67). In its case law, the ECJ
first established "a hermeneutic monopoly" (Mancini) over the concept of worker
and the rights attached to it, and then interpreted both as broadly as possible.
Articles 48 to 51 of the EEC Treaty, which establish the "freedom of
movement for workers", do not define who is a worker. As the ECJ determined
in Hoekstra (1964), "worker" had to be a Community term, because otherwise
"each Member State (could) modify the meaning of the concept of 'migrant
worker' and...eliminate at will the protection afforded by the Treaty to certain
categories of persons" (quoted in Craig and DeBurca, 1995:662). In subsequent
case law, the Court has used its hermeneutic monopoly in a very liberal way,
defining as work every "effective and genuine economic activity" (Levin case of
1982), which included part-time work, work below the minimum wage, and
unpaid work. In Antonissen (1989), the court ruled that the "freedom of
movement for workers" even included the right to look for work in other member
states. This was plainly against the meaning of Article 48, which allowed only
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demand-induced migration, that is, free movement "to accept offers of
employment already made". This wording was not accidental, but betrayed the
intention of member states to reduce the migratory implications of the
Community (see Romero, 1993). With Antonissen, the Court single-handedly
turned demand- into supply-induced migration, thus increasing potential
migration within the Community, in direct contradiction to state interests.
Not only did the ECJ interpret the notion of worker as broad as possible,
it also defined the two remaining weapons of member states--the "public
service" and "public interest" derogations of Article 48--as narrow as possible.
Article 48(4) states that the free movement rights "shall not apply to employment
in the public service." In dealing with this "public service" derogation, the Court
followed the same strategy as above: establish that "public service" is a
Community concept, and then interpret it in the "spirit" of the Community treaty,
which is about eroding the barriers to the "free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital". In the two Commission v. Belgium cases (1980 and 1982),
whose importance to the member states is evidenced by the fact that Belgium
was supported by the governments of the United Kingom, Germany, and
France, the member states claimed an institutional interpretation of "public
service", according to which the site of employment mattered. This would mean
that states had the right--in the case of France and Belgium even the
constitutional obligation--to restrict railway, hospital, or postal jobs to their
nationals. The Court did not follow this reasoning, arguing that for the sake of
the "unity and efficacy" of Community law "public service" had to be a
Community concept, and then prescribing a narrower, functional understanding
of this term as denoting the actual exercise of state authority, for instance, by
policemen, soldiers, or tax assessors (see Craig and DeBurca, 1995:677).
The Court applied a similarly narrow interpretation to the "public interest"
derogation, the second state defence against free movement rights, according
to which the latter were "subject to limitations justified on grounds of public
policy, public security or public health" (Art.48.3). In the early days, member
states had used this derogation expansively to expel unwanted pocket thieves,
prostitutes, members of religious sects, or trade-union activists. In successive
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case law, the Court narrowed down the grounds for deportation to exceptional
cases of individually proved "personal conduct" that threatened "the
fundamental interests of society," which was a threshold very difficult to take by
member state governments (Boucherau case of 1977, quoted in Mancini,
1992:76).
It is important to visualize the context of all of these Court decisions: the
denial of residence permits or deportation orders against EU aliens by member
states, which were invalidated by the Court's creative interpretation of "migrant
worker". While the Court could not sever the functional nexus between "worker"
and the entitlement to free movement, it made it close to meaningless.
ECJ activism thus destroyed the capacity of sovereign nation-states to
control the conditions of entry and residence of a large class of non-citizens,
which in each case by far exceeded the number of own citizens--this alone
qualifies as a novelty in the history of the international state system. The
enormity of this intervention is even magnified if one considers not only the
scope, but the substance of the free movement right. Applying the general non-
discrimination clause of the Community treaty (Article 6) to the free movement of
workers, Article 48(2) prescribes "the abolition of any discrimination based on
nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment,
remuneration and other conditions of work and employment." This sounds
harmless, and does not go much beyond the bilateral agreements that have
framed the recruitment of guestworkers in postwar Europe. However, "judicial
acrobatics" (Mancini) of the European Court of Justice have turned the non-
discrimination guarantee into a massive, workplace-transcending encroachment
on national education and welfare systems, which even dwarfs the EU-induced
loss of state control over entry and residence.
The lack of a European social policy is proverbial and much-deplored
(e.g., Streeck 1996). However, most authors have overlooked the "negative"
social policy reforms forced upon member states by the imperative of
unhindered labour mobility (see L ibfried and Pierson, 1995). Among other
adaptive changes, welfare states have lost control over their beneficiaries, as
they were forced by EU law to include EU aliens on equal terms. Of particular
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importance for the "low politics" of ECJ-driven social policy coordination has
been Regulation 1612/68, a secondary legislation that explicates substantive
rights of workers and their families (who are not mentioned in the EEC Treaty).
An extensive list of migrant rights already, it has been even more extensively
interpreted by the Court. Article 12 of this regulation guarantees "equal access"
for children of migrant workers to the host state's educational system. In Michael
S. (1973), the Court ruled that the list of educational arrangements enumerated
in the article was not exhaustive, and could cover also disability benefits--and
this in contravention to a Belgian law that granted disability benefits only to
those foreigners who had been diagnosed as disabled ft r their entry in
Belgium. This rule amounted to an invitation for welfare shopping (see Garth,
1986:102). In Casagrande (1974), the Court determined that "equal access" to
the educational system included the entitlement to state-paid educational grants
for secondary school in Germany (which so far had been confined to nationals).
This controversial rule construed a link between European free labour mobility
and educational and cultural policy, over which the Community usually has no
competence, and which in Germany is even the prerogative of the subfed ral
Laender.
But the most far-reaching provision for migrant workers and their families
has been Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68, which states that migrant workers
"shall enjoy the same social and tax advantages as national workers." In its case
law, the ECJ detached the notion of social advantage from linkage with
employment, so that it came to justify, for instance, the right to a minimum wage
for the parent of a migrant worker, university grants for the benefit of a migrant
worker's child, or reduced railway fares for large families (see Mancini, 1992:74).
In Reina (1982), even an interest-free 'childbirth loan' issued by a German state
bank to German nationals in order to boost the country's low birthrate was
considered a "social advantage" within Article 7(2), so that it could not be
withheld from an Italian couple living in Germany. This meant that the free
mobility imperative incapacitated a member state's demographic policy, and its
attempt to tie a however small benefit to citizenship. "Are there limits to the
rights which may be claimed by a worker under Article 7(2)," two authors have
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asked, apparently rhetorically (Craig and DeBurca, 1995:693). Because, short of
the political right to vote in national elections, through the Court's liberal
interpretation of this clause there are practically no limits to substantive rights
accrueing from free movement.29
The friendly picture for EU aliens is counterpointed by a decidedly less
friendly picture for non-EU aliens. These "immigrants" proper, who form the
large majority of non-citizen residents in the EU,30 are definitionally excluded
from the reach of EU law. The free movement clauses of the Treaty (Articles 48
to 51) do not specify the nationality of "workers", so that it is possible to construe
residence, rather than nationality, as the activating condition (see Plend r,
1988:197). However, secondary legislation and Court of Justice rules have left
no inch of a doubt that only member state nationals were cov red by these
clauses.
The contradiction of expansive rights for third-state resident aliens at the
member state level and their niggardly exclusion from the European project has
been the target of endless polemics, but it still awaits a convincing scholarly
explanation. Such an explanation would certainly identify the grounding of free
movement rights in nationality rather than residence as a "political choice" by
member states, who wished to minimize the migratory implications of an
integrated Europe (O'Leary, 1992:66).31 If one applies a state analogy to the EU,
the exclusion of third-state nationals from free movement rights amounts to a
state reserving civil and social rights to its citizens only, which is a deviation from
the practice of liberal states to grant such rights also to its resident aliens. The
successful inclusion of third-state nationals at member-state level
notwithstanding, it is questionable if such a gross violation of liberal stateness
by the EU can be stable over time.
The sharp distinction between privileged EU aliens and non-privileged
third-state aliens shows that even at supranational level it is bounded quasi-
citizen norms rather than unbounded human rights norms that have helped (or
hindered!) the integration of immigrants. At the EU level, third-state nationals
enjoy only indirect rights, which accrue from family ties to EU citizens or
employment ties to EU service providers.32 Secondly, third-state nationals have
36
rights flowing from international agreements, such as the "association treaties"
between the EU and Turkey and a number of Maghreb countries. Finally, third-
state nationals have resort to the non-EU, nationality-blind European
Convention of Human Rights.33 Taken together, these European sources of
immigrant rights are inferior to (and sometimes imitative of) the protections that
settled third-state aliens enjoy at the member state level (see Guiraudon,
1998b).
Since the mid-1970s, the European Commission (the executive organ of
the European Union) has waged repeated initiatives to bring third-state nationals
under the umbrella of Community law--to no avail (see Cholewinski, 1997:233-
237). Control over external immigration has turned out to be one of the most
jealously guarded prerogatives of member states. Wh n the Commission, in
1985, wanted to bind the member states into a notification and consultation
procedure regarding their external immigration and immigrant policies, the
member states successfully appealed through the ECJ, and they added to the
Single European Act of 1987 that "nothing in these provisions shall affect the
right of Member States to...(control) immigration from third countries..." (quoted
in Papademetriou, 1997:24). In the wake of the Maastricht Treaty, which invited
the member states to at least "coordinate" their external immigration policies
within the so-called Third Pillar, a second Commission attempt to launch a
comphrehensive European approach to immigration was all but ignored (ibid.,
83-88). The Amsterdam Treaty's move of the immigration function from the
intergovernmental Third Pillar into the supranational First Pillar, however, will
make a European policy on third-state nationals inevitable. And the sheer fact
that borderless free movement will remain unavailable to member state
nationals if third-state nationals continue to be controlled by states suggests
upward pressure on the rights of the European Union's remaining "immigrants".
(2) Transition to Citizenship. Nationality is, next to the concept of worker, one of
the two "connecting factors" that determine who may benefit from freedom of
movement in Europe (Evans, 1991:191). It is an often noted "legal paradox"
(O'Leary, 1993:353) that the Community has vindicated to itself the definition of
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"worker", but has left the definition of "nationals" to the member states.34 There
is legal space for the European Court of Justice to apply to the domain of
citizenship and nationality policy its doctrine of implied powers (see Weiler,
1991:2415-17), which had already helped it to encroach on national education
and demographic policies in the name of pursuing the Common Market
objective.35 Political prudence not to attack an elementary and universally
acknowledged function of state sovereignty in international law may have
prevented it from doing so.36 The state prerogative over the determination of
nationality is acknowledged in the citizenship clause of the Maastricht Treaty,
according to which citizenship of the Union derives from "holding the nationality
of a Member State". To leave no space for ambiguity, the member states added
to the Treaty a Declaration on Nationality, which affirms that the determination
of member state nationality "shall be settled solely by reference to the national
law of the member State concerned." And the Amsterdam Treaty seeks to
forego an evolutive reading of the citizenship clause by stating that "citizenship
of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship".
However, there has already been subtle pressure on member states'
nationality laws by the European free movement right,37 which is bound to
increase over time.38 Applying the free movement of goods analogy to the free
movement of people, Europe's "people" solution of internal free movement
governed by EU law and external access governed by national law is like
removing internal tariff barriers without establishing an external tariff, and thus in
direct contrast to Europe's "goods" solution in which both internal a d external
regulations were communitarized (see Weiler 1999:326). Leaving nationality a
matter to be determined by member states, without reference to Community law,
to a certain degree empties the Court's painstaking Communitarization of the
concept of worker of "its meaning and purpose" (O'Leary, 1992:41), because
states can offset their losses at the workers front through a restrictive handling
of nationality, with discriminatory effects for people. Conversely, member states
have no possibility to counteract an expansive nationality policy of a fellow
member state, and they are forced to accept unilateral expansions of the Euro-
citizenry potentially crowding their labour markets and education and welfare
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systems. This has been the case in German unification, which with one strike
increased the Euro-citizenry by some seventeen million people, and yet was
accepted with remarkable equanimity by the fellow member states.39 For one
author the "inequalities resulting from differences in nationality laws render it
politically essential and legally imperative for the Union to establish uniform
conditions governing the acquisition or loss of the citizenship of Member States
or to establish a real federal Union Citizneship, independent of the nationality of
a Member State" (Closa, 1995:513).40
These legal pressures nothwithstanding, there are no signs that the
European Union is moving toward a common nationality regime, not even
toward a harmonization of member state nationality laws.41 It must be pointed
out that in the history of federal states there are precedents to the European
constellation: before the German Reichs- und Staatsangehoerigkeitsgesetz of
1913 and before the American 14th Amendment of 1868, federal citizenship in
both countries derived from subfederal state citizenship, over whose
determination the federal governments had no authority. By the same token, a
European Union citizenship that took precedence to state citizenship would
mark the point at which the Union turned into a full-blown federal state with its
own nationality to distribute. This is the outcome that all European states of
today are set to avoid. The "legal paradox" of communitarized workers and still-
national nationals is therefore none from a political point of view. Defining
workers corresponds to the logic of a functional regime; defining nationals would
turn a functional regime into a territorial state. This seems too high a hurdle to
take for any legal automatism, even one as robust as that of the European
Union.
Despite the absence of a European citizenship and nationality regime,
there is still a European convergence of national regimes due to policy
emulation.42 While there is no vertical imposition of European norms, there is a
horizontal diffusion of "adequate" European ways of dealing with citizenship and
nationality questions. This constellation was evident in the recent German
reform of citizenship law. On the one hand, there was a complete absence of
perceived European Union constraints in this domain;43 th s was a purely
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national debate to resolve a purely national immigration problem. On the other
hand, there was a close scrutiny, popularized by the print media, of the
considerably more liberal citizenship laws in neighbouring countries.44 The
horizontal influence of European norms was evident in Chancellor Schroeder's
remark that a "modern" citizenship law would make Germany "adequate for
Europe" (europafaehig).45
In substantive regard, the European convergence of citizenship and
nationality norms revolves around a right to citizenship for second-generation
immigrants, either at birth or at majority age, which is now granted by all
member states of the EU except Austria, Luxemburg, and Greece (Hansen,
1998:760). In addition, the new Nationality Convention of the (non-EU) Council
of Europe, which was introduced in 1996, departs from the old principle of strict
avoidance of multiple nationality (enshrined in its 1963 predecessor) and
suggests to the signing states to "allow" double citizenship resulting from birth or
naturalization for the sake of better immigrant integration.46 Considering that all
ratifying states of the old Convention (except Norway) have in the meantime
become members of the European Union, and that major non-EU immigrant-
sending states like Turkey and Yugoslavia have never been part of the
convention, this change of heart is not as astonishing as it seems, but reflective
of the very integration of Europe.47 Even with regard to its non-European
immigrants, however, the major immigrant-receiving states, including France,
the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and--most recently--Germany, tolerate double
citizenship. Those who deplore the formal exclusion of non-EU immigrants from
the European project (e.g., Kostakopoulou, 1998) should not forget that the
European convergence on liberal citizenship and nationality norms has allowed
them to become part of it much like the non-immigrant rest: through the national
main road.
Conclusion
The preceding comparison demonstrated the central role of courts and domestic
legal orders (especially constitutions) for the development of immigrant rights,
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while suggesting to differentiate carefully according to the type of immigrant
right, migrant group, and polity under investigation. It is time now to link the
generalizing and particularizing strands of this analysis. The case of immigrant
rights is part of a larger trend in postwar societies, in which activist courts have
aggressively defended the rights of individuals against intrusive states. Next to
policing the complex division of powers within an expanding state machinery,
the protection of fundamental rights and liberties has been one justification for
courts to take on the role of active policy-maker, and thus to intrude into a
domain that had previously been reserved to parliament and the executive
(Shapiro and Stone, 1994:414). A long-standing feature of American political
life, the judicialization of politics is a novelty in Europe, where reference to the
democratic deficit of the judiciary and a traditional view of the state as sole
originator of rights, against whom individuals could not have rights, had
previously kept courts and the legal system in low profile. The legal
empowerment of immigrants, which we could observe in all three polities
considered here, is thus part of a larger story of an expanding judicial domain
and the proliferation of "rights" that goes along with it.
However, the picture of an adversarial relationship between courts as
rights-defenders and executive states as rights-bashers, which was conveyed
by this comparison, needs to be qualified. In functionally differentiated societies,
legal systems are autonomous, and they operate according to system-specific
codes and principles, which are different from those that govern the political
system (see Luhmann, 1993). But courts are also dependent parts of political
regimes, endowed with the tasks of conflict resolution and social control (see
Shapiro, 1981). Immigrants--always vulnerable individuals in need of protection
from vindictive states--are tailor-made objects for courts to assert (in important
respects: citizenship-blind) individual rights against the whims of majoritarian
governments. If one defines individual rights as "trumps" (R.Dworkin) over the
preferences of the government-represented majority in society (see Waldron,
1991:364f), one could even argue that immigrants--by definition excluded from
this majority--are the most dramatic test case of rights in general. Yet there is
also a line, differently drawn in different polities and varying over time, that
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prudent and self-limiting courts will not transgress. The German Constitutional
Court has championed the rights of guestworkers, but in the context of a
wavering government that only symbolically affirmed to preside over a "no
immigration country" and that stepped back from rotating its unwanted migrants-
as-settlers. By contrast, when the government was firm in its intention to close
down unwanted asylum-seeking, the Court refused to get into its way,
rubberstamping an unprecedented restriction of a fundamental right guaranteed
by the Basic Law.48 The American Supreme Court has mostly defended the
rights of permanent resident aliens (legal immigrants) against state
governments, which arrogated to themselves unconstitutional immigration
powers. When it tackled the politically more sensitive case of illegal immigrants,
in Plyler v. Doe, the Court clarified that its immigrant-friendly decision was
premised on the absence of a countervailing federal policy. And the Court has
never dared questioning the plenary power doctrine, which gives the federal
government the upper-hand in all immigration matters. Finally, the European
Court of Justice has single-handedly transformed migrant workers into Euro-
citizens, which was not the least daring of its many factual state-building
exercises. However, it has abstained from venturing the possibility that the
"workers" or "persons" granted free movement rights by the European
Community Treaty could be defined by residence rather than nationality. And
the Court has not dared to bring the definition of nationality into the ambit of
Community law, even though the legal possibility for this exists.
One critical variable for the readiness of courts to champion immigrant
rights is the degree of political and societal conflict surrounding immigration. If
conflict is low, Courts are likely to take more daring stances--and vice versa.
This has been the case in Germany, where the Constitutional Court's crucial
guestworker rules happened during the 1970s and early 1980s, which was--
except a first national debate on mass asylum-seeking in 1980--a period of low
conflict intensity. Similarly, the US Supreme Court's landmark rules on immigrant
rights, culminating in Plyler v. Doe (1982), were issued at least a decade before
a massive anti-immigrant movement would spread eastward from California.
This resonates with Virginie Guiraudon's (1998) interesting findings, based on
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the cases of Germany, the Netherlands and France, that episodes of rights
expansion for immigrants were conditional upon keeping the public out, and
containing the issue behind the "closed doors" of bureaucracy and judiciary. In
her view, under conditions of low conflict, state executive and judiciary are even
more like accomplices, rather than adversaries, in an "enlightened" treatment of
immigrants.
Danger arises when the public becomes involved, and democratically
accountable governments are pushed into defending the rights of "their" people-
-who are by definition not immigrants. These are moments of the potential
reversal of immigrant rights. This paper touched on two examples of "high
conflict" surrounding immigration: America's welfare reform, and Germany's
(pending) citizenship reform. Both worked to the detriment of immigrants, and in
both there was little judicial interference (at least so far). In the US case, the
Republican-dominated Congress waned itself protected by its plenary power on
immigration matters. One cannot know the future, but a conservative Supreme
Court that in a string of recent decisions against affirmative action has proved
susceptible to the current backlash against immigrants and minorities is unlikely
to seize this opportunity to question the (however antique) plenary power
doctrine. In the German case, the reach of constitutional law on citizenship
matters is highly limited, giving the political lawmaker wide discretion. The
debate surrounding the "option model", in which double citizenship is more
restrictively handled than in the original reform proposal, still gives a flavour for
the pervasive judicialization of politics: it was formulated and scrutinized
beforehand according to its compatibility with the Basic Law, to make it
withstand a possible Constitional Court intervention.49 Interestingly, a Court
verdict against the Option Model could have the opposite effect of throwing the
government back to its first double citizenship proposal, which it had abandoned
for political reasons.50
The involvement of courts in the development of immigrant rights differed
not only according to the level of conflict, but also according to the type of
immigrant right under consideration. In all three cases, the degree of judicial
assertiveness was remarkably higher regarding alien rights than regarding the
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acquisition of citizenship. This was most drastically expressed by the European
Court of Justice's wholesale abstention from the domain of nationality law. As
we saw in the German and US cases, alien rights are grounded in constitutions
that guarantee certain elementary individual rights independently of citizenship
status. Not to discriminate against settled aliens, who work and pay taxes like
citizens, corresponds to a fundamental sense of justice that provides an easy
ground for judicial intervention. The situation is different regarding the
acquisition of citizenship. As Michael Wa zer (1983:ch.2) has argued
normatively (and as is universally recognized in international law and
conventions), the distribution of membership is an expression of elementary
national self-determination, and as such cannot be subject to considerations of
justice. The discretion of national communities to determine the accession of
new members is reflected in a general absence of constitutional provisions on
citizenship--with the exception of the United States, whose slavery problem
forced it to introduce a constitutional citizenship clause. Walz r added, however,
that justice considerations did apply to people who can claim a "sense of place".
An example are settled immigrants who--once admitted to permanent residence
on the territory--could be excluded from the citizenry only at the cost of
producing metic-like second-class citizens (ibid., p.56-61). Interestingly, the
guestworker-receiving states of Western Europe have implicitly followed this
reasoning, in lowering their citizenship hurdles for long-settled and later-
generation immigrants. Yet these were political choices, motivated perhaps
more by pragmatic order than by normative justice considerations; they were not
the result of legal mandates, imposed by independent courts on unforthcoming
governments, as was the pattern regarding alien rights.
Next to stressing the legal sources of immigrant rights, I also showed that
a thoroughly transnational phenomenon, migration, has found a thoroughly
national treatment--perhaps most extremely in the European Union case, which
left non-EU migrants entirely outside its legal grid. This goes against the grain of
a recent "postnational" approach that sees migrants protected by international
human rights norms and discourses. A legal version of the postnational
approach has been presented by David Jacobson (1996), who claims that
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international human rights norms, as embodied in customary law, treaties, and
conventions, have become the central legitimizing principle of Western states.51
"Midwives" of the postnational state, according to Jacobson, are domestic
courts, which are said to "pay increasing attention to international--indeed,
transnational--laws and norms" (ibid., p.106). Unfortunately, Jacobson does not
provide any empirical evidence for these bold propositions.52 N t only is
international law "soft" law that lacks implementation force; there also is no need
for domestic courts in Western Europe and North America to invoke
international norms, because the scope of protection provided by domestic
constitutions is by far superior (see Guiraudon, 1998b).53
A more sociological version of the postnational approach comes from
Yasemin Soysal (1994). Whereas Jacobson was at least concrete enough to
zero in on one presumed carrier of international human rights norms (courts and
international law), Soysal conceives of international human rights as a more
diffuse and discursive "institutionalized script" (p.7) that shapes actor identities
and provides states with clues for how to treat foreigners in their territory. She
claims that on the basis of global human rights norms a "postnational model of
membership" has come into existence, which has relativized the importance of
traditional citizenship. As evidence for the effectiveness of global-level norms
she adduces the fact that similar schemes of postnational membership can be
found across (European) states. Not unlike Jacobson, Soysal sees states as
mere transmission belts of global human rights norms.54
Because of its vagueness, the "discursive" version of the postnational
approach is more difficult to counter. Its strongest point is certainly to offer a
parsimonious explanation for the convergent trend of expansive alien rights
across postwar states. A purely domestic approach fails in this respect, unless it
incorporates diffusion and demonstration effects, whereby similar ideas and
institutions find sedimentation in different societies. Yet this is no novelty
resulting from "globalization". Reinhard Bendix has famously shown that
systematic international borrowing and emulation via print-based "intellectual
mobilization" dates back to the era of Reformation and overseas exploration:
"Once the church was challenged, a king beheaded, or a parliament supreme,
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once industrialization was initiated and the ideal of equality proclaimed, no
country could remain unaffected. Everywhere people were made aware of
events and 'advances' which served as reference points for the assessment of
developments at home" (Bendix, 1978:265). States have never been monads,
but mutually imitative of their ideas and institutions--after all they are all "nation
states" displaying homologous principles and structures. However, discursive
postnationalists go one step further in stating that "human rights" are not just an
invention of one state spreading to other states, but an own reality existing
outside and separate from states, meeting states as external constraints.
Applied to immigrant rights, the onus of this approach is to show that the latter
derive from this extra-state, "transnational" reality. This forces Soysal, much like
Jacobson, into a mechanical listing of "explicit" international human rights codes
and conventions (pp.145ff), conveying rather than demonstrating their
effectiveness at domestic level. However, if my analysis is correct, the latter are
plainly irrelevant: not international norms and conventions, but domestic
constitutions have been the spring of immigrant rights.
What, then, is the role of more modestly conceived diffusion and
demonstration effects in the development of immigrant rights? It depends.
Regarding constitution-based alien rights, they are almost nil. The European
Union, as we saw, does not know the very concept of (non-EU) alien rights. In
the United States, the triggering factor for mobilizing the "personhood" clause of
the Constitution has been the domestic civil rights revolution in the 1960s, which
suggested a perception of aliens as race-analogous "discrete and insular
minority" that should not be discriminated against. In Germany, the trauma of
Nazism, where the state had carved out a "racial" group only to annihilate it,
incapacitated the state to "rotate" unwanted guestworkers-turned-settlers, and
emboldened the Constitutional Court to put life into the Basic Law's celebration
of universal human rights that no state was allowed to mess with. In both cases,
the legitimation (not just implementation) of expansive alien rights after World
War II thus has exclusively domestic roots.55 The temporal marker "after World
War II" points to the only communality between both, the moral outlawing of all
that smacked of ethnic, national, or racial discrimination after the West's victory
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over a regime that had carried such discrimination to its murderous extreme.
Regarding the acquisition of citizenship, which is less constitutionally
constrained and thus grants more flexibility to the lawmaker, diffusion and
demonstration effects are more readily visible. An exception is again the
European Union, whose embryonic citizenship scheme differs so radically from
conventional state citizenship that the very possibility of the "diffusion" of
citizenship models does not arise. In the United States and Germany, diffusion
worked in opposite directions. Regarding the United States, negative reference
to the "European" exclusion of long-settled immgirants from the citizenry helped
deflect a challenge to historically inclusive citizenship. In Germany, positive
reference to the more inclusive citizenship in Western states increased the
pressure on its anomalously exclusive citizenship.
Postnationalists have misjudged not only the locus of immigrant rights,
but also their logic. In postnational reading, immigrant rights are universal
human rights, which protect abstract "personhood" (Soysal) irrespective of an
individual's communal boundedness and involvements. However, regarding
migrants, the only such "personhood" right is probably the right of asylum. For
all other migrants, a different, communitarian logic is at work: the scope of rights
increases with the length of residence and the development of ties with the
receiving society. This was most clearly expressed in the German legal doctrine
of Rechtsschicksal der Unentrinnbarkeit, according to which over time even the
constitutional citizen rights (except the right to vote) could not be denied to long-
settled foreigners. Tempered by a stronger constitutional equality norm, a similar
"affiliation model" (Motomura, 1998) has also undergirded the rights of legal
permanent residents in the United States. It was formulated most explicitly in the
Supreme Court's Mathews v. Diaz (1976) decision, which allowed the federal
government to deny Medicare benefits to permanent residents who have been
in the country for less than five years: "Congress may decide that as the alien's
tie (with this country) grows stronger, so does the strength of his claim to an
equal share of that munificence" (quoted in Motomura, 1998:205). This affiliation
model is not without contradictions, because it reduces the incentive to
naturalize, and thus devalues citizenship.56 In any case, according to the logic of
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affiliation and Unentrinnbarkeit immigrant rights are not abstract human rights
but bounded proto-citizen rights hat reflect the involvement of individuals in the
rights-granting community.
The current revaluation of citizenship, which we could observe in the
United States and Europe alike, points to a final shortcoming of the postnational
approach. Postnationalists have slanted the role of formal state membership for
immigrants, because they deem the latter enmeshed in a "transnational" reality,
in which the local and the global have pincered the national. As the US
experience demonstrates, the absence of political rights--which everywhere
continue to be the privilege of citizens--makes immigrants defenseless victims of
discriminatory public policies, in this case, it made them bear the brunt of the
federal welfare cuts.57 Regarding Europe, the absence of citizenship for
otherwise perfectly integrated "postnational members" has been perceived by
all, including the immigrants, not as the victory of a brave new order, but as a
painful anomaly that is in need of correction. The pan-European trend of turning
immigrants into citizens marks the ultimate verdict over the postnational
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